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I.

PUENTE

One of the most neglected fields of the law for some time has
been that dealing with the legal status of foreign consular officials
in the United States. Notwithstanding that there are in the
neighborhood of fifteen hundred accredited foreign consuls in this
country, looking, in multifarious ways, after the general wellbeing of countless resident aliens, and the commercial and other
interests of their respective governments and non-resident nationals, necessitating, it would seem, some intelligent understanding by the legal profession of the judicial position of these
public agents, we find, even at this late period, a widely diffused
lack of familiarity by the bench and bar with the interesting and
important question of the amenability of foreign consuls to the
local civil and criminal process of the state to which they are accredited. For a time, even scholars presumably conversant with
the orthodox international legal position of these agents, displayed considerable confusion of thought. Let us illustrate this
divergence of opinion with two typical cases. While De Cussy
says: I "La nature de leur service dans leurs rapports avec le gouvernement qui les institue,-et diverses attributions de leur charge,
d6montrent, d'une mani~re positive, qu'on ne saurait, en effet
1

REGLEMENTS CoNsuLAImEs (I8I) I6. To the same effect see i DE CLERcQ
AND DE VALLAT, GUIDE DE CoNsuLATs (5th ed. I898) 4.

(447)
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refuser aux consuls envoys la double qualit6 d'agent politique et
d'agent diplomatique," Fiore tersely states the prevailing-and,
we believe, the correct-view in these words: 2 "Les consuls
n'ont pas le qualit6 d'agents diplomatiques, car ils ne representent pas l'Etat dans ses relations politiques internationales."
We shall attempt in this expository article to deal in a pragmatic light-from the practitioner's point of view, in other words
-- with the question of the nature and extent of the liability of foreign consular officers to civil and criminal process in the United
States; and to this end, the textual rather than the polemic method
of exposition has been adopted. I like the way Professor Pearce
Higgins has put it: '
" 'A lawyer must be orthodox, else he is no lawyer,'
says Maitland, and this is true of international as of other
lawyers. His prime duty is to know the law and, if he be a
teacher or writer, to expound it as he finds it."
This duty will be the controlling consideration in the short
exegesis of the law concerning consular amenability which follows.
I.

EARLY LEGAL STATUS OF CONSULS

In the early Middle Ages, and before the establishment of
more or less permanent legations, consuls appear to have enjoyed the right of exterritoriality, and with it, the privileges and
immunities now accorded to diplomatic representatives.
But
upon the establishment of legations, and the entrusting of the
political interrelation of the nations to accredited public ministers,
the exemptions and immunities granted to consuls came to be regarded as an unwarranted limitation of the territorial rights of
the local sovereign, and they have, in the process of time, been
restricted to such as are necessarily incident to the consular office,
or have been provided for by treaty, or are supported by longestablished custom or the particular laws of the receiving state.
A consular officer in civilized countries does not possess now, under
22 FIORE,

NouvEAU

'STUDIES

IN

DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (2d

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

ed. 1885) 595, § 1181.
98.

(1928)

FOREIGN CONSULS AND AMERICAN COURTS

public law, as regards the country to which he is accredited, 4 the
characteristics of a diplomatic agent, and is not, in any degree, invested with the representative political character; neither is he
entitled, by virtue of his office, to be regarded as a diplomatic
agent of his sovereign even in the absence of the accredited public
minister or chargi d'affaires of his country. He cannot, therefore, justly claim the privileges usually accorded to diplomatic
functionaries. 5 Although considered, for local purposes, as a public agent," he is not, ordinarily, employed in the management of
national political concerns, 7 and his representative character and
authority are for commercial purposes only." But even in this
limited capacity, all his acts must be considered as of a public
character, 9 and should be-and, in practice, are-clothed to some
extent with the protection of the law of nations, in the form of
certain exemptions and privileges,1 ° which, if violated by the authorities of the receiving state, will give his government a right
to complain. 1 Nevertheless, he is not, strictly speaking, entitled
2
to the full benefit of the jus gentiumn.
Occasions may and do often arise where in a country in which his government has no public minister, the
duties of a consul will expand, of necessity, into a larger field, because he will be called upon to communicate with his own government or with that near which he resides, in matters which would
otherwise devolve upon a public minister. But it does not follow
INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1920) 599.
Clarke v. Cretico, 1 Taunt. io5 (x8O8) ; Viveash v. Becker, 3 M. & S.
284 (1814) ; Comm. v. Kosloff, 5 S. & R. 545 (Pa. 1816) ; letter from Secretary of State Jefferson to Mr. Gore, 5 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST
(i9o6) 34; I Op. ATT'Y Gm. 41 (1794); 2 FIORE, loc. cit. supra Tlote 2";
CAMPOS, DERECHO INTERNATIONAL PUBLICO (3d ed. 1912) 255.
'The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435 (U. S. 1818); Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., IO3 U. S. 261 (I880).
"State v. Da La Foret, 2 Nott & McCord 217 (S. C. 182o).
'The Anne, supra note 6; Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co.,
supra note 6; State v. De La Foret, supra note 7.
'FIopE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED (Borchard's transl. 5th ed. 1918)
'OPPENHEIZt,
5

§495.

z Viveash v. Becker, supra note 5; Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating
Arms Co., supra note 6.
'Viveash v. Becker, supra note 5.
"Viveash v. Becker, supra note 5.
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that, because a consul may be admitted under such circumstances
to address the general government, he becomes a diplomatic personage, with international rights as such, and among them that
of exterritoriality. If his commission be that of consul only, and
his public recognition be an exequatur, the consul will continue
amenable to the local laws of the receiving state. True, our government may consent to the superaddition of diplomatic dutieswith the formalities indicated for diplomatic agents-to the ordinary duties and powers of a consul, as where a consul is also
charge d'affaires ad hoc or ad interim; and this is not considered
in any light as inconsistent with the law of nations. In such a
contingency, the consul has a double political capacity, and though
invested with full diplomatic privileges, within the limits of his
appointment, yet he becomes so invested as possessing a superior
diplomatic character, and not as consul; and the fact of such casual duplication of functions does not change the legal status of the
consul, whether he be regarded through the eye of the law of nations or that of the United States. 13 In the authoritative case of
In re Baiz,14 which involved a consul's claim to diplomatic immunity from suit in virtue of his pretended character as a chargi
d'affaires ad interim, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, of the Supreme
Court of the United States, made the following pertinent observations:
"Diplomatic duties are sometimes imposed upon consuls, but only in virtue of the right of a government to designate those who shall represent it in the conduct of international affairs, i Calvo, Droit Int. 586, 2d ed. Paris, 1870,
and among the numerous authorities on international laws,
cited and quoted from by petitioner's counsel, the attitude of
consuls, on whom this function is occasionally conferred, is
perhaps as well put by De Clercq and De Vallat as by any,
as follows:
" ' There remains a last consideration to notice, that of
a consul who is charged for the time being with the management of the affairs of the diplomatic post; he is accredited in this case in his diplomatic capacity, either by a letter
'The Anne, Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., both supra
note 6; In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403, IO Sup. Ct. 854 (i89o).
. Supra note 13, at 422, IO Sup. Ct. at 859.
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of the minister of foreign affairs of France to the minister
of foreign affairs of the country where he is about to reside, or by a letter of the diplomatic agent whose place he is
about to fill, or finally by a personal presentation of this
agent to the minister of foreign affairs of the country.' Guide
Pratique des Consulats, Vol. I, p. 93."
The approved doctrine of international law, and the practice of nations, is that a foreign consul is not entitled, as of right,
to the immunities of a public minister 15 from legal process, 16
and is, therefore, like any other individual, 17 subject civilly, 8 as
well as criminally,'9 to the ordinary jurisdiction of the tribunals
of the country to which he is accredited. As said by United States
Attorney General Butler, in a forceftil opinion : 20
"A consul is not such a public minister as to be entitled
to the privileges appertaining to that character; nor is he
under the special protection of the law of nations. He is entitled to privileges to a certain extent, such as for safeconduct; but he is not entitled to the jus gentium. Vattel
thinks that his functions require that he should be independent of the ordinary criminal jurisdiction of the country; and
thaf he ought not to be molested, unless he violate the law
of nations by some enormous crime; and that, if guilty of
any crime, he ought to be sent home to be punished. But no
such immunities have been conferred on consuls by the modem practice of nations; and it may be considered as settled
law, that consuls do not enjoy the protection of the laws of
nations any more than any other persons who enter the country under a safe-conduct. In civil and criminal cases, they
are equally subject to the laws of the country in which they
reside. The same doctrine, declared by the public jurists, has
been frequently laid down in the English and American
courts of justice."
i1 Op. A r'Y GEN. 41 (794) ; ibid. 4o6 (i82o) ; 2 ibid. 725 (1835).
2'7 Caldwell v. Barclay, i Dall. 305 (U. S. about 1788) (in the note thereof).
2

Gittings v. Crawford, Fed. Cas. No. 5,A65 (C. C. Mo. 1838).

", Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542 (U. S. 1868) ; Gittings v. Crawford, supra
note i7; Lorway v. Lousada, Fed. Cas. No. 8,517 (D. C. Mass. 1866) ; St.
Luke's Hosp. v. Barclay, Fed. Cas. No. 12,241 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i855) ; I OP.

ATf'Y GEN. 4o6 (i82o).
I Coppell v. Hall, supra note i8; Clarke v. Cretico, Viveash v. Becker,
Comm. v. Kosloff, all supra note 6; 70 p. ATr'Y GEN. 367, 384 (i855).
'2

Op. A'-'y GEN. 725 (1835).
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States, however, have attempted to protect their consular
service from the injurious consequences that might flow from permitting the local authorities to exercise against their consuls, on
any pretext whatsoever, that complete freedom of criminal action which each state possesses under international law. Various
governments-among them that of the United States-have
agreed, by treaty, to exempt consuls de carri~re "from preliminary arrest except in the case of offences which the local legislation qualifies as crimes and punishes as such," 21 or, as expressed
in the more recent engagements, "from arrest except when
charged with the commission of offenses locally designated as
crimes other than misdemeanors and subjecting the individual
guilty thereof to punishment." 22
II.

EXCLUSTON OF STATE COURTS

A few preliminary remarks become necessary on the jurisdictional question before touching on the existing constitutional
and statutory provisions relative to this subject.

It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of a court depends upon
the state of things at the time the action is brought, and that after
vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.2

3

But where the

24

exercise of jurisdiction is in violation of law, as where the
court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of
the cause of action, 25 all the proceedings, as coram non judice, are
wholly void.2 6 Accordingly, where the court is without jurisdiction when the action is commenced, and during its pendency the
legal impediment to such jurisdiction is removed, there is no
2

I MALLOY, TREATIES,

CONVENTIONS, ETC., BETWEN THE UNITED STATES

1776-i909 (IgiO) 95, consular convention with Belgium,
concluded March 9, i88o, art. III; ibid. 978, consular convention with Italy,
concluded May 8, 1878, art. III; 3 ibid. 2847, consular convention with Sweden,
concluded June I, i91o, art. III.
= 44 STAT. 2148, art. XVIII (1925) (treaty of friendship, commerce and
AND OTHER POWERS,

consular rights with Germany); 44 STAT. 2454, art. XV (1926) (treaty of
friendship, commerce and consular rights with Hungary); 44 STAT. 2473, art.
V (1926) (consular convention with Cuba).
Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537 (U. S. 1824); Koppel v. Heinrichs,
I Barb. 449 (N. Y. 1847).

"Griffin v. Dominguez, 2 Duer 656 (N. Y. 1853).
'Mills v. Martin, i9 Johns. 7 (N. Y. 1821).
"Griffin v. Dominguez, supra note 24.

FOREIGN CONSULS AND AMERICAN COURTS

basis, in law, upon which subsequently to incorporate or validate
the action.2 7 No lawyer will controvert the position that to support and give validity to the proceedings of a court, it must have
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and of the cause of
action. This principle is applicable to all courts, from the highest to the lowest. 28

In other words, no court can continue an

action and render judgment therein after the cause of action or
the personal jurisdiction over the defendant has been withdrawn
or has been removed therefrom. It has no jurisdiction except to
dismiss the action or expunge it from the records. "Jurisdiction
is the power to hear and determine a cause;" and it must exist
over the subject-matter of the action as well as over the parties.
If there never was or there is no longer any subject-matter or
party amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, then there is no
jurisdiction. Authorities are numerous to the effect that jurisdiction can be lost by a court after having been acquired, as readily
as it can be assumed where there is none in the first place. 29 Consequently, the enforcement, by attachment or garnishment proceedings against a foreign consul, of a judgment obtained against
him in the state courts prior to his appointment and recognition
as consul, will be abated on the verified petition or suggestion of
the consul.a0 Garnishment or attachment is a suit,31 or proceeding,32 within the meaning of Section 256 of the FederalJudicial
Code, vesting in the courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction of all suits and proceedings against consuls and vice
consuls. The recognition of the consul through the issuing of the
exequatur-his titre justificatif, as Merignhac describes it 3brings into immediate operation the benefits conferred by Section
'Naylor v. Hoffman, 22 How. Pr. 510 (N. Y. 1862), re/g, Rock River
Bank v. Hoffman, 22 How. Pr. 250 (N. Y. 1861).
'Mills

v. Martin, supra note 25.

"Two Rivers Mfg. Co. v. Beyer, 74 Wis.

210, 42 N. W. 232 (1889).
' In the Matter of Aycinena, I Sandford 690 (N. Y. 1848).
' GriTi v. Dominguez, supra note 24.
'Illinois Glass Co. v. Holman, ig Ill. App. 30 (1886); Gregg v. Savage,
51 Ill. App. 281 (1893) ; Webster v. Steele, 75 Ill. 544 (1874). For §256 of
the Judicial Code see 36 STAT. 1161 (19I1), 28 U. S. C. §337 (1926).
=2 MERIGNHAC, TRAITE DE DROIT PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL (1907) 326.
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256, and abates all further auxiliary or incidental 34 suits or proceedings in the nature of garnishment, attachment, execution, or
the like, against the consul.
Another jurisdictional principle of considerable importance
in this connection is this: that where powers are given exclusively
to the federal government, or where expressly taken away from
the states, the states cannot exercise them; or, when the power
given to the federal government is inconsistent or incompatible
with the exercise of that power by the states, the states are excluded. But, when the power is given to the federal government,
and not expressly taken away from the states, and the exercise
of such power by the states is not incompatible or inconsistent
with the use of it by the federal government, the power is concurrent. 3 Accordingly, when the Act of Congress of September 24,
1789,36 which provided that the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States over consuls and vice consuls "shall be exclusive of
the courts of the several states," was repealed by the Act of February i8, I8752 it was generally admitted and so held in a number of adjudications, that between the date of the repealing act
and March 3, 19iiI-the date of the re-enactment of the original
provisions of the Act of 1789 concerning consuls and vice consuls-the federal court were without any exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over them.38 The state of the law between 1875
and i91 I is well summed up in the case of DeLeon v. Walters,3 9
in the Supreme Court of Alabama, in I9O9. The defendant
(plaintiff in error on appeal) was, at the time suit was brought
against him, the Consul General of Guatemala, and claimed that
the jurisdiction of the federal courts was exclusive of that of
'Tinsley

'State

v. Savage, 50 Mo. 141 (1872).

v. De La Foret, supra note 7.

sI STAT. 73, §§9, II, 13 (1789), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41, 341, 342, 371 (1926).
18 STAT. 317 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 371 (1926).
37

'Wilcox v. Luco, I8 Cal. 639, 50 Pac. 758. (1897); DeGive v. Grand
Rapids'Furniture Co., 94 Ga. 6o5, 21 S. E. 582 (1893) ; State v. De La Foret,
supra note 7; Redmond v. Smith, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 323, 54 S. W. 636 (1899) ;
Scott v. Hobe, io8 Wis. 239, 84 N. W. I8I (igoo); Bors v. Preston, iii U. S.
252, 4 Sup. Ct. 407 (884).
For an excellent resume of the legislative history
of §256, see Higginson v. Higginson, 96 Misc. 457, 158 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1916).
"163

Ala. 499, 502, 5o So. 934, 935 (199o).
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the state courts; but the supreme court overruled the objection,
saying:
"It cannot be doubted that prior to the act of Congress
of date February i8, 1875 (i8 Stat. 316, c. 8o), the District
Court of the United States had exclusive jurisdiction in suits
against consuls of a foreign power by a citizen of the United
States. Such was repeatedly decided in such cases, and such,
indeed, was the language of the statute.-Rev. St. U. S.
§7 11 ; Davis v. Packard,7 Pet. 276, 8 L. Ed. 684; McKay v.
Garcia, 6 Ben. 556, Fed. Cas. No. 8,844; Miller v. Van
Loben, 66 Cal. 341, 5 Pac. 512; Sartori v. Hamilton, 13
N. J. Law, 107; Valarino v. Thompson, 7 N. Y. 576, and
others. By the said act of February 18, 1875, the former
statute was repealed, and said act did not give exclusive
jurisdiction in such cases to the United States District Court,
and the state courts now have jurisdiction to hear and determine cases, in civil matters, although the defendant may
be a consul general of a foreign power.-Rev. St. U. S. (2d
Ed.) § 563 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 455); Frovient v.
Duclos et al. (D. C.) 30 Fed. 386; Bors v. Preston, iii U. S.
261, 4 Sup. Ct. 407, 28 L. Ed. 419; De Give v. Grand Rapids FurnitureCo., 94 Ga. 605, 21 S. E. 582."
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
The Constitution of the United States, 40 provides:
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
. . to all Cases afmade, under their Authority; .
fecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con"
suls.
There is a manifest propriety, amountifig sometimes to practical necessity in order to avoid international complications, that
the prosecution, punishment or pardon of consuls, which would
materially affect their personal attention to their consular duties,
should be within the control of the federal courts and of the general government to which the consuls are accredited and which
alone is responsible to foreign powers for the treatment of their
"Art. 3, Sec.

2.
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42
representatives. 4 Accordingly, it has been enacted by Congress,
that:
"The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United
States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned,
shall be exclusive of the courts of the several States: .

(8) Of all suits and proceedings against

consuls

or vice-consuls."
The federal jurisdictional amount of three thousand dollars,
it has also been provided, 43 shall not apply to "any of the cases
mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
Eighteenth. Of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls." The
immunity thus granted from the process of the state courts has
been granted as a matter of policy, 44 to keep the control of such
affairs as affect our international relations in the hands of the
federal government, 45 and so prevent the harassing of foreign
governmental officials with suits in the state courts. 46 The Act
of Congress is evidently intended to apply to those who, at the
time of the suit or proceeding, possess a recognized consular character, since to extend the immunity from legal process in the
state courts to consuls whose exequaturs have been revoked, or to
consuls who have had a reasonable time to leave the country after
such revocation, might lead to much embarrassment in the administration of the criminal or civil laws of the states. 47 The
statute is not only constitutional, 4 s but its provisions are so plain
and unambiguous as to leave no room for construction, and the
courts should not read into it exceptions or limitations which depart from its plain meaning. 49 The effect of Section 256 has been
"In re Iasigi, 79 Fed. 752 (S. D. N. Y. 1897), aff'd, i66 U. S. 391, i7
Sup. Ct. 595 (i8o7) ; Valarino v. Thompson, 7 N. Y. 576 (1853) ; In the Matter of Aycinena, supra note 3o; Savic v. City of New York, 203 App. Div.
8i, 196 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1922).
,'36 STAT. 116o, §256 (igii), 28 U. S. C. §34i (1926).
3536 STAT. I09I, §24 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §4i (1926).
"Savic v. City of New York, supra note 41.
' Valarino v. Thompson, supra note 41.

"In the Matter of Aycinena, supra note 30.
' Savic v. City of New York, mspra note 41.
"Davis v. Packard, 7 Pet. 276 (U. S. 1833).
"Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill.
i8o, io6 N. E. 785 (1914).
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to divest the state courts of all jurisdiction over consuls or their
property, 50 be such consuls de carritre or honorary; 51 and it is
now the duty of those courts, whenever the fact is brought to
their knowledge that a defendant in a pending suit or proceeding
is a foreign consul, to confess at once their want of jurisdiction,
and declare their proceedings to be void.5 2 It has, accordingly, been
held that a state court has no jurisdiction of a consul in a suit for
divorce or separation; 53 or for attachment for debt; 54 or to issue
a citation for examination as a judgment debtor; 5 5 although, in
an attachment suit, where a foreign consul is summoned as garnishee, the service of the state process will not be sei aside on the
ground of his privilege as a consul, the Act of Congress being restricted to cases in which the consul is made a defendant directly
and originally-to respond for his own debt or other liability. 6
While, on the one hand, the immunity of a consul from the
jurisdiction of the state courts does not extend so far as to enable
a party, after a suit or proceeding has been commenced against
him in a state court of competent jurisdiction, to divest that court
of jurisdiction over him by voluntarily accepting the office of consul of a foreign power,5" on the other hand, the process of a
state court which is void ab initio for want of jurisdiction when
the suit was commenced, owing to the consular character of the
defendant, cannot be validated by the subsequent revocation of
the exequatur of the consul, and no jurisdiction is conferred on
I McKay v. Garcia, Fed. Cas. No. 8,844 (S. D. N. Y. I83) ; St. Luke's
Hosp. v. Barclay, supra note I8; Miller v. Van Loben Sels, 66 Cal. 341, 5 Pac.
512 (I885) ; Sartori v. Hamilton, 13 N. J. L. 107 (1832) ; Valarino, v. Thomp-

son, supra note 41; Griffin v. Dominguez, supra note 24; Taaks v. Schmidt,
i9 How. Pr. 413 (N. Y. i86o) ; In the Matter of Aycinena, supra note 30;
Comm. v. Kosloff, supra note 5; Mannhardt v. Soderstrom, i Binn. 138 (Pa.

18o6).
v. Thompson, supra note 41.
"' Griffin v. Dominguez, supra note 24.
' Higginson v. Higginson, supra note 38.
"In the Matter of Aycinena, supra note 30.
' Griffin v. Dominguez, supra note 24.
'Valarino,

' Kidderlin v. Meyer, 2 Miles 242 (Pa. 1838).
'Koppel v. Heinrichs, supra note 23, overruled on other grounds, Griffin

v. Dominguez, supra note 24.
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the state courts by such revocation."
The pendency of a suit
against a foreign consul in the state courts will not bar another
suit for the same cause of action in the proper federal court; " but
it does not empower the latter to interfere by writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a consul held on a criminal charge in the state courts,
nor to admit him to bail pending an appeal from the order deny60
ing the writ.
Jurisdiction is not a matter of sympathy or favor, and the
state courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority,"' and, of their own motion, even though the question is
not raised by the pleadings or is not suggested by counsel, to
recognize the want of jurisdiction, and act accordingly by staying the proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise noticing
the defect.6 2 There is, at present, no statutory impediment to
the bringing of a suit or proceeding by a foreign consul in a state
3
court.6
The exemption enjoyed by a foreign consul from the jurisdiction of the state courts belongs to the government he represents,6 4 and he cannot waive it by failing to answer in chief,"'
or to plead it, 60 or by his withholding the suggestion of it until
after judgment,6 7 or by being joined as defendant with others
' Naylor v. Hoffman, supra note 27, reelg, Rock River Bank v. Hoffman,
supra note 27, which held that "the court takes jurisdiction from the time of
the revocation without prejudice to the previous proceedings."
' McKay v. Garcia, supra note 5o.
' In re lasigi, supra note 41.
"Reid v. U. S., 211 U. S. 529, 29 Sup. Ct. 171 (199o).
'Blacklock v. Small, 127 U. S. 96, 8 Sup. Ct. io96 (1887); Wolff v.
McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 57 So. 754 (1911) ; Hill v. Moors, 224 Mass. 163, 112
N. E. 641 (1916); In re Letcher, 269 Mo. 140, 19o S. W. ig (ii6); Griffin
v. Dominguez, supra note

24.

Sagory v. Wissman, Fed. Cas. No. 12,217 (S. D. N. Y. 1868); Koppel
v. Heinrichs, supra note 23.
6, Davis v Packard, supra note 48; Miller v. Van Loben Sels, supra note
50; Durand v. Halbach, i Miles 46 (Pa. 1835); Ex parte Gruber, 269 U. S.
302, 46 Sup. Ct. 112 (1925).
'Taaks v. Schmidt, supra note 5o.
w Miller v. Van Loben Sels, supra note 5o; Wilcox v. Luco, supra note
38; Valarino v. Thompson, .tpra note 41; Durand v. Halbach, supra note 64.
Contra: Hall v. Young, 3 Pick. 8o (Mass. 1825). The case of Flynn v. Stoughton, 5 Barb. 115 (N. Y. 1848), has been overruled by Valarino v. Thompson,
supra note 41.

' Durand v. Halbach, supra note 64.
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not entitled to the privilege; Os and, like any other consular privilege, may be taken advantage of for the first time on appeal, 609
or at any other stage of the proceedings.7 ° A party may certainly
waive a privilege which is granted to him personally. Regula est
juris antiqui, omnes licentiam habere his, qua pro se indulta sunt,
renunciare. But a privilege or exemption not prescribed peculiarly for his benefit, but entirely dependent on his official character, raises a question of jurisdiction, which he can never, upon
any principles of justice, be permitted to waive or renounce, since
the privilege or exemption, though affording protection and security to him, is especially designed to benefit others, and to guard
interests in which he may have but a slight participation, and
which he is not bound as a mere agent to protect.7 1 The consul
can, therefore, repudiate the proceedings of the state courts and
refuse to be bound by them, notwithstanding that he may once
have consented to their action, either by appearing and pleading to
the merits, or by any other formal or informal action. He may
avail himself of this right at any stage of the case; and the maxim
that requires one to move promptly who would take advantage of
an irregularity does not apply here, since this is not mere irregular action, but a total want of power to act at all. Consent is
sometimes implied from failure to object; but there can be no
waiver of rights by laches in a case where consent would be altogether nugatory. 2 Under some treaties,73 whenever a consular
officer accepts the office of administrator of the estate of a national
of the country he represents, he subjects himself as such to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal making the appointment for all per'Valarino v. Thompson, supra note 41; Taaks v. Schmidt, supra note 5o;
Naylor v. Hoffman, supra note 27; Durand v. Halbach, supra note 64; Bixby
v. Janssen,
Fed. Cas. No. 1,452 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1869).
6
Miller v. Van Loben Sels, mtpra note So.
"-Valarino v. Thompson, supra note 41; Griffin v. Dominguez, supra note
24; Hunstiger v. Kilian, 13o Minn. 538, 153 N. W. lo95 (1915).
Holtzclaw v. Ware, 34 Ala. 3o7 (1859); Miller v. Van Loben Sels,

supra note 50.

CooLEY, CONSTrTIONAL LImrrATIONS (7th ed. 19o3) 576.
44 STAT. 2478, art. XIII (1926) (consular convention with

Cuba); 44
2458, art. XX (1926) (treaty of friendship, commerce and consular
rights with Hungary); 44 STAT. 2153, art. XXIV (1925) (treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights with Germany).
STAT.
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tinent purposes to the same extent as a national of the state where
he is appointed; which in the United States means that he becomes
subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts, there being no fed4
eral law of probate or of the administration of estates.
The Constitution of the United States also provides: " "In
all Cases affecting

.

.

Consuls

.

.

.

.

the supreme

Court shall have original jurisdiction." A case affects a consul, within the meaning of this provision, when it acts or operates
upon, or concerns the consul. 76 Manifestly, this provision refers
to consular representatives accredited to the United States by foreign powers, and not to those representing this country abroad,
and was, no doubt, inserted, in view of the important and sometimes delicate nature of our relations and intercourse with foreign governments. 77' This grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court of cases affecting consuls is not exclusive, and
does not prevent Congress from conferring concurrent original
jurisdiction over consuls on subordinate national courts. 78 The
grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court
does not, of itself, imply that the jurisdiction is to be exclusive.7 9
III. INQUIRY INTO OFFICIAL ACTS OF FOREIGN CONSUL

Conforming to the familiar principle that every public officer will be presumed to have done his duty and not to have exceeded the limit of his authority,8 0 a court of justice will not call
in question a foreign consul for acts evidently done by him in his
official character, and for which his government alone is responsible. In accordance with the recognized principle of international
I Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317, 32 Sup. Ct. 207 (1912) ; In. re Servas'
Estate, 169 Cal. 240, 146 Pac. 651 (1915) ; Pagano v. Cerri, 93 Ohio St. 345,
112 N. E. 1037 (1916).
The author is preparing a study on ConsularProtection
of the Estates of Deceased Nationals, to appear in the near future in the ILL
L. REv.
r Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 2.
Gaunt v. Alabama Bound Oil & Gas Co., 281 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922), 23 A. L. R. 1279 (923).

• Ex parte Gruber, supra note 64.
SBors v. Preston, supra note 38; U. S. v. Ravara,
Lorway v. Lousada, supra note i8.
Gittings v. Crawford, supra note 17.

1793) ;

'Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal.

27

(1852).

2 Dall.
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law, such consul is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the country to which he has been accredited in all that
relates to acts executed in the exercise of his official duties and in
the name of the government which he represents."' But where
the authority or power exercised by the consul does not appertain
to him virtute oflcii, but is a limited and specific power or authority conferred by statute, the law raises no presumption or intendment in support of his doings, until it is shown that his act
was within the scope of his authority.,8 2 It would be pushing the
comity usually extended to the officers of a foreign government
beyond the bounds of justice and the usages of nations, to claim
for them a total exclusion from inquiry when their acts affect the
rights of another nation or its citizens.8 3 If, therefore, the consul acts in obedience to instructions not strictly warranted by law,
he is answerable in damages to any person injured by their execution; s4 and if he does an act professedly official, any individual
affected thereby may try in our courts the question whether the
act was done within the scope of the consul's authority.8 5 Although a consul, for a transaction in which he acts as the commerical agent of his government, is not amenable to any judicial
tribunal in the United States for what he does in pursuance of
his commission, 8 yet the President cannot constitutionally interfere with judicial proceedings between an individual and such
consul where the controversy may have a legal trial, 7 but must
leave the matter to the determination of the courts of justice.8 8
According to the opinion of Secretary of State Fish: 89
' Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 Dall. 383 (U. S. 1798) ; Patch v. Marshall, Fed.

Cas. No. 1o,793 (C. C. Mass. 1853); 1 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 81 (1797); I HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. i9o8) 400; 2 MERIGNHAC, op. Cit. suPra
note 33, at 336; I PIEDELIEVRE, PREcis IDROiT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1894)
55'.
,The Atlantic, Fed. Cas. No. 62o (S. D. N. Y. 1849).
1U. S. v. King, 3 How. 773 (U. S. 1845).
"Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (U. S. 1804).
'Lorway v. Lousada, supra note I8.
681 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 8i (1797).

InIbid.
68 Ibid. 77.

'To Mr. de Colobiano,
ed. 1887) 777.
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"The Executive has no capacity to control or influence
the deliberations of any court, State or Federal. If it shall
be made to appear after the consul has fairly presented his
case and prosecuted his defense to the court of last resort
that manifest error has intervened and has not been corrected, it may then become the duty of the executive Government to consider its obligation to repair the wrong. Meantime it is the duty of the consul to avail himself of the means
of defense which our jurisprudence affords, and not contribute by his own negligence to an erroneous decision."
Where, however, the proceedings are in the name of the
United States, as a criminal prosecution, the President may, if
he thinks proper, arrest the proceedings by a nolle prosequi.
IV.

ATTENDANCE AS WITNESS

It has never been doubted, as a matter of public international law, that consular officials are bound to obey a subpw;za to appear before a judicial tribunal of the receiving state;
and the only limitations-if any there be--on this general duty,
must be sought for in the treaties or the special provisions of the
local law.
The earliest treaty provision undertaking to regulate this duty
of a consul to answer a judicial subpwna when issued against him,
is the Clayton-Rivas Treaty of i85o, between the United States
and New Granada, which provides: 91 "Whenever the presence
of consuls may be required in courts or offices of justice, they shall
be summoned in writing." The concession made to foreign consuls under this clause was somewhat negligible. But in 1853, the
following sweeping provision was inserted in the Everett-Sartiges
Treaty between the United States and France: 92
"They shall never be compelled to appear as witnesses
before the courts. When any declaration for judicial purposes, or deposition, is to be received from them in the administration of justice, they shall be invited, in writing, to
0i Op. A'r'Y

GEN. 406 (182o).

MALLoy, op. cit. supra note 21, at 318, concluded May 4, i85o.
92I MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 599, concluded Feb. 23, 1853.
91 1
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appear in court, and if unable to do so, their testimony shall
be requested in writing, or be taken orally at their dwelling."
France thus became the most-favored nation in the matter
of consular exemption from compulsory judicial process. 93
This provision of the Everett-Sartiges Treaty was subjected
in 1854 to judicial construction in It re Dillon,9 4 which involved
the right of a federal court to issue a subpcena duces tecum against
a French consul in behalf of a defendant. The court, after commenting on the analogous position of French consuls under the
treaty, to that of public ministers under the law of nations, held:
"The consul is by a treaty, which is the supreme law,
..
placed beyond the reach of the process of the court .
From all the provisions of the consular convention, it is
obvious that it was intended to clothe the consul with some,
at least, of the privileges of ambassadors, and so far as compelling his attendance as a witness is concerned, to place him
beyond the reach of the process of the courts. He is, therefore, out of the jurisdiction to the same extent and in the
same manner as the ambassador, who is regarded, by a fiction of law, as retaining his domicile in his own country,
and beyond the jurisdiction of the country in which he actually resides."
The provision was again subjected to judicial scrutiny in
1891, in U. S. v. Trumbull.96 The case involved the legality of a
claim by the consul of Chile, to immunity from compulsory process in behalf of the prosecution. To draw upon himself the benefit of the French treaty, the consul relied on the most-favorednation clause as contained in the treaty between this country and
Chile, of 1832, which provided that each contracting power should
grant to the "envoys, ministers and other public agents" of the
other, the same "favors, immunities, and exemptions which those
' Baiz v. Malo, 27 Misc. 685, 58 N. Y. Supp. 8o6 (I899).
"Fed. Cas. No. 3,914 (N. D. Cal. 1954).
. Ibid. 712.
048 Fed. 94 (S. D. Cal. i8gi).
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of the most favored nations do or shall enjoy." '7 The court
brought the consul under the category of a public agent, followed
the precedent in the Dillon case, and summed up its own position
as follows: 9s

"And if he is entitled, as in effect it is declared he is,
by article 25 of the convention of 1832, and by the exequatur
issued to him by the president, to the same privileges and immunities as are granted to the consuls of France, it would
seem to follow that he is exempt from compulsory process
to attend the court as a witness."
The Trumbull case was followed in 1899 in Baiz v. Malo, 9
which also involved article 2 of the French treaty, in a successful
claim by the vice consul of Colombia in New York to most-favored treatment under the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846 between the United States and New Granada, later Colombia. 100
Due largely to the international complications which arose
in consequence of the arrest of the French consul, M. Dillon,
which ultimately resulted in his being judicially declared to be
exempt from compulsory process, the federal government has,
with but two departures, insisted, since i868--when the consular convention with Italy was made-in supplementing the
clause stipulating for immunity for consuls de carri~re from compulsory judicial process, with a provision to the following effect :101
"In all criminal cases contemplated by the sixth article
of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
whereby the right is secured to persons charged with crimes
to obtain witnesses in their favor, the appearance in court
of said consular officer shall be demanded, with all possible
regard to the consular dignity and to the duties of his office."
The article, in its amended form, would seem to extend the
right to compulsory process against consuls only to persons
9 1 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at i78, concluded May 6, 1832, art.
XXV.
SSupra note 96, at 98.

Supra note 93.
1001 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 310, concluded Dec. 12, 1846, art.

XXIX.

10I 1 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 963, concluded Feb. 8, I868, art.
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charged with crimes, and not to the prosecution. Whether the
appearance of a consul in criminal cases in the state courts can
be demanded, depends, in view of Section 256 of the Judicial
Code hereinbefore considered, entirely on the provisions of each
treaty. It would seem that, unless specifically required by the
terms of the treaty, a consul cannot be required to answer the
subpcena of a state court in any civil or criminal proceeding depending before such court. But in any event, where a subpoena
duces tecum directed to a foreign consul is prayed for, it is the
duty of the court to require the party praying for it to show that
the document is not an official paper, protected by law from examination and seizure, 1 2 since the consul cannot be required to give
evidence of matters relative to the consular business, nor to produce to the court any part of the consular archives, without the
consent of his government.'0 3
CONCLUSION

The net results from the analysis of the foregoing principles of the law of nations, the provisions of the Constitution,
the Acts of Congress, and the judicial expositions which have been
given to them, is:
I. That a foreign consul is amenable to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state;
2. That no civil suit or criminal prosecution can be commenced against a consul in any state court;
3. That such consul may, at his election, commence a suit
in a state court (in other respects of competent jurisdiction)
against an individual;
4. That a consul may be sued, or proceeded against, civilly
and criminally, in the courts of the Union, in the same manner
as a private individual;
5. That in civil suits and criminal prosecutions against a
consul, within the limits of the criminal jurisdiction of the District Courts, the District Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of such suits or prosecutions;
In re Dillon, supra note 94.
'Kessler v. Best, 121 Fed. 439 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i9o3).

'2
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6. That the Supreme Court of the United States has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of suits in which a consul is
a party;
7. That a foreign consul is not protected by, international
law from appearing as a witness, in answer to compulsory process, unless the right of the receiving state to demand his attendance has been expressly restricted by treaty between the two governments.

